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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN

RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS

STATE GRNC

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SECRET LONDON 7391 SECTION

NATUS

EXDIS

SUBJ: TRIPARTITE TALKS

1. DURING THE COURSE OF MARCH 13 MCCLOY MET SEPARATELY IN A.M. WITH THOMSON AND THEN WITH DUCKWITZ WHO HAD COME TO LONDON AT US INVITATION, AT 6P.M. THREE DELEGATIONS MET TRIPARTITELY, AFTER WHICH MCCLOY AGAIN MET BILATERALLY WITH THOMSON, FIGGURES AND OTHER UK OFFICIALS AND FINALLY WITH THOMSON AND BARNES WITH NO NON-FONOFF BRITISH OFFICIALS PRESENT.

2. DURING MORNING MEETINGS WITH THOMSON AND DUCKWITZ MCCLOY EXPLAINED DECISIONS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE IN WASH MEETINGS SINCE HIS VISIT LONDON FOR LAST TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS. HE EXPLAINED US INABILITY TO REPEAT ANYTHING IN THE NATURE OF NEW \$35 M DEAL & THAT IN OUR VIEW THE POUNDS 7M (\$20 M) WHICH WAS FX ACCRUAL TO UK OF US FORCES RELOCATED IN UK FROM FRANCE SHOULD BE COUNTED BY BRITISH, AS WELL AS POUNDS 12.5 M (\$35 M) US HAD MADE AVAILABLE TO BRITS LAST DEC. HE SUGGESTED THAT IF BRITISH WOULD RECOGNIZE THE ADDITIONAL POUNDS 7 M FLOWING FROM TRANSFER OF TROOPS FROM FRANCE US WOULD ACCELERATE ORDERS UNDER F-111 \$325 MILLION AGREEMENT AND ADOPT A PROGRAM OF ADVANCE PAYMENTS TO HELP GET UK "OVER THE HUMP," EMPHASIZING THAT DETAILS OF CONCEPT WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT ON MILITARY LEVEL, HE ALSO EXPLAINED CONCEPT OF ONE DIVISION-THREE AIR WING ROTATION WHICH WAS NOW PART OF US APPROACH TO TRIPARTITE PROBLEM, ASSUMING UK LIMITATION TO ONE BRIGADE WITHDRAWAL. ONE BRIGADE, DIVISION HQ, AND THREE AIR SQUADRONS (ONE FROM EACH WING) WOULD REMAIN ON THE GROUND AT ALL TIMES, WITH FREQUENT EXERCISES AND PERIODIC ROTATION SO THAT DIVISION AND AIR SQUADRON ELEMENTS IN CONUS WOULD BE FAMILIAR WITH TERRAIN, ETC.

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DATE _____

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
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-3- LONDON 7391 (SECTION ONE OF TWO) MARCH 14



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NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 11:07 A.M., 3-14-67.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 11:35 A.M., 3-14-67.

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Action

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN
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1967 MAR 14 AM 10 55

SECRET LONDON 7391 SECTION TWO OF TWO

NATUS

EXDIS

SUBJ: TRIPARTITE TALKS

EXITS REVIEW

Out A - Caption removed:
transmitted to O/FADDC

Out B - Transmitted to O/FADDC
with caption removed
controlled by S/S

Out C - Caption not ready
submitted by S/S

Reviewed by: Elipah King

Date: March 7, 1967

London 7391
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-2-, LONDON 7391, MARCH (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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-3- LONDON 7391 MARCH 14 (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

[REDACTED]

MCCLOY SAW THOMSON ALONE THIS MORNING AND
CAME VERY CLOSE TO AGREEMENT WITH HIM ON AMOUNT OF "OVERDRAFT,"
WHICH IS CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN "TO BE FOUND" FIGURE CITED IN EIGHT
ABOVE. HE WILL REPORT IMMEDIATELY ON ARRIVAL. KAISER
PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, 3/14/67
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Encl. No. 3
A-848 from Tokyo

effective for Japan, and the other is how to construct an ABM system.

As regards the first question, that is, the effectiveness of ABM's Japan's geographic conditions are extremely disadvantageous for the deployment of ABM's. There are two reasons for this, that is, Japan lies at a short distance from the continent, and it will be impossible to predict as to from what direction an attack will be made.

The first reason, that is, Japan is located near the continent, means that, IRBM's with a range of about 2,000 kilometers will be used in a missile attack on Japan, and, though the time needed from firing to arrival will differ according to the speed of missiles, it will be about ten minutes or ten-odd minutes, at most.

Speaking of the United States' ABM system against ICBM's for comparison's sake, it will consist of radar in three-fold array and interception missiles in two-fold array. First long-range PAR (perimeter air search radar) will catch the warhead of an enemy missile at a distance of about 4,000 kilometers, or 14 or 15 minutes before its arrival. When the missile approaches about 3,000 kilometers, or about 10 minutes before its arrival, a Spartan long-range interception missile will be fired. When the enemy missile approaches about 1,000 kilometers, the radar will be switched to MAR (multiple-array radar capable of undertaking identification of a target and guidance of an interception missile), which will guide the Spartan to the warhead of the enemy missile and detonate it about 2 minutes before the latter's arrival, at an altitude of several hundred kilometers. If the Spartan misses the enemy missile, MSR (missile site radar) will track it and a Sprint short-range interception missile will be fired to intercept it at an altitude of 30-40 kilometers.

Radar will detect a warhead for the first time at a distance of 4,000 kilometers. However, in the case of Japan, an IRBM will cover a distance of 2,000 kilometers in ten or ten-odd minutes. If its range is 2,000 kilometers, the apogee of its trajectory will be about 1,000 kilometers. If its time of flight is 14 minutes, it will reach the apogee in seven minutes after firing. It will be during one or two minutes around that time, when radar can catch its warhead. Compared with the United States' ABM's, the first stage of PAR must be excluded.

Moreover, if such a missile is fitted with plural warheads, such as those being developed by the United States and the Soviet Union, interception will become even more difficult.

Direction of Attack Cannot Be Predicted

As for the second question, that is, the prediction as to a direction, ABM's have directivity. For instance, according to the British Strategic Research Institute's recent report, the Soviet Union's ABM's now being deployed near

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Moscow and Leningrad will be effective against America's ICBM's which will come flying across the North Pole, but they will be ineffective against Polaris fired from the Mediterranean Sea or the Indian Ocean. In the case of the United States, the direction from which China's ICBM's will come flying can be predicted. In the case of Japan, however, it is not possible to predict as to from what part of the continent an attack will be made, because IRBM's are mobile.

Next, on the question of the construction of an ABM system, there are two methods, that is, whether Japan will develop it on its own or import it from the United States.

If a conclusion is to be drawn on the first method, that is, development by Japan's own efforts, it will be almost impossible. First, as regards nuclear warheads, Japan is numbered among the most prospective nuclear nations. To be sure, Japan will possibly be able to produce, technically, plutonium by burning uranium in an atomic reactor and process it to produce plutonium atomic bombs, in two years or so. However, Japan will not be able to produce hydrogen bombs of the megaton class. In order to produce hydrogen bombs, uranium must be enriched to proceed from uranium atomic bombs to hydrogen bombs. This technique is little known in Japan.

The techniques on rockets are also insufficient. For instance, Tokyo University's present rockets will be of no use. For instance, though the Lambda 4S's acceleration is 14 G (14 times gravity), that of the Sprint is 100 G, which is incomparably greater. Japan's rocket techniques today are not suitable for rigid military purposes. For example, Japan has decided to produce Nike Hercules at home from this year. Though the Nike Hercules is an American rocket of 20 years ago, it is said that the Japanese manufacturer is having difficulty because of the rigid performance requirements.

The techniques of radar seem to be even worse. The expert opinion is that "Japanese radar is at a stage where the domestic production of radar for the Nike Hercules is going to start through the introduction of techniques from the United States. Radar for ABM's calls for identification accuracy of over 100 times that of the radar for the Nike Hercules, its techniques are top secret, and its production in Japan is inconceivable."

Umbrella of US ABM Fleet -- Will It Be a Plus or a Minus?

The United States has reportedly spent \$2 billion (¥720 billion) on the development of ABM's. It must be said to be hopeless for Japan to catch up with the United States in the technical aspect, for the time being. If so, there will be no alternative but to import ABM's, from the United States, if they are to be deployed in Japan.

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The U. S. side is also thinking of the deployment of ABM's in Europe and Japan, and its cost is estimated at from \$3 billion to \$12 billion in the case of Europe, and \$2 billion in the case of Japan. Also, the U. S. Navy has a plan for the construction of an ABM fleet, whereby ABM's will be carried by large-size submarines and surface vessels. The plan aims at a double purpose -- early interception of ICBM's aimed at the United States and the defense of its allies -- by deploying such a fleet along the coasts of the Soviet Union and China. It will not constitute, to be sure, the "bringing in of nuclear weapons."

There also is the argument that deployment in neighboring countries will help prevent nuclear proliferation. For instance, India could be dissuaded from arming itself with nuclear weapons by constructing ABM's against China. However, in such a case, the problem of sharing expenses, which are expected to reach several billion dollars, will be inevitable.

Only US and USSR Will Acquire Outstanding Strength

There is a view that the deployment of ABM's by the United States will be a plus to Japan's security, and there is another view that it will be a minus.

The former says that "Since there will be no need for the United States to worry about China's nuclear attack, if China threatens Japan, the United States will retaliate on China without fail. Therefore, the power to check an attack from China has increased." The latter says that "It denies America's hitherto-adopted view that nuclear weapons can check war, and a nation's security cannot be entrusted to this nuclear deterrent power."

We will have to watch the future development to judge as to which is correct. However, it seems to be a fact that the cautious view that only the United States and the Soviet Union will come to rank even higher in nuclear war potential, and Europe will become a military vacuum area, is predominant in Europe.

(Reporter ISHII, International Situation Research Council)

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy BONN
AmEmbassy LONDON
AmEmbassy PARIS

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XR FN 12
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STATE 159094

NATUS

SUBJECT: Trilateral Meeting, March 21

1. Trilateral March 20 meeting was taken up with statement by German Principal on decisions affecting UK offset which were taken by March 15 meeting of German cabinet, and by response of British Principal setting forth UK position in light of these decisions.

2.

[REDACTED]

Drafted by: EUR:RPM:MRGannett:gw.3/21/67	Tel. Ext. 3434	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: SCM-Eugene W. McAuliffe
Clearances: XXXXXX	REVIEWED BY: <i>Raji</i> DATE: 4/1/85	

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8. ~~_____~~ Talks to resume morning of March 21.

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